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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment order from the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, American Fork Department, dated June 6, 2006. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
There are no statutory or constitutional provisions applicable to this case. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "the owner of a business is not a guarantor 
that his business invitees will not slip and fall." Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 
P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996). Accordingly, in order to impose liability on a storeowner for 
a slip and fall accident, the injured plaintiff must show that the storeowner knew or 
should have known of the slippery condition and had adequate time to remedy the 
hazardous condition. 
In the present matter, Donna Jex slipped and fell on a puddle of water 
approximately four inches in diameter on the floor in the Hickory Kist Deli. No one 
knows how the puddle of water came to be there or how long it had been there prior to 
Ms. Jex's accident. Because Ms. Jex cannot establish that the Hickory Kist Deli, James 
Fillmore, or Angela Fillmore (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Hickory Kist 
defendants") had actual or constructive notice of the puddle of water, her claim must fail 
as a matter of law. 
The Brief of Appellant counters that notice on the part of the Hickory Kist 
defendants is not required because they employed a method of operation which created 
the hazardous condition on which Ms. Jex was injured. However, it was a puddle of 
water, temporary in nature, without known source or duration of its existence, rather than 
a method of operation, that caused Ms. Jex to slip and fall. Accordingly, Ms. Jex must 
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prove actual or constructive notice to survive summary judgment. Because she cannot do 
that, the Court should affirm the trial court's ruling of summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Alleged Condition on Which Donna Jex Slipped and Fell Was Temporary 
in Nature. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that in store slip-and-fall matters 
such as this one, there are two classes of negligence cases. See Allen v. Federated Dairy 
Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975); Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478; Merino v. 
Albertsons, Inc., 975 P.2d 467 (Utah 1999). 
The Schnuphase court explained: 
The first [class] involves some unsafe condition of a 
temporary nature, such as a slippery substance on the floor 
and usually where it is not known how it got there. In this 
class of cases it is quite universally held that fault cannot be 
imputed to the defendant so that liability results therefrom 
unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of 
the condition, that is, either actual knowledge, or constructive 
knowledge because the condition had existed long enough 
that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such 
knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of 
reasonable care he should have remedied it. 
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478 (citing Allen, 538 P.2d at 176). The court continued: 
The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of a 
permanent nature, such as: in the structure of the building, or 
of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or in the 
manner of use, which was created or chosen by the defendant 
(or his agents), or for which he is responsible. In such 
circumstances, where the defendant either created the 
condition, or is responsible for it, he is deemed to know of the 
condition; and no further proof of notice is necessary. 
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Id. (citing Allen, 538 P.2d at 176). Thus, the threshold issue to be determined is whether 
the alleged condition on which Donna Jex slipped ai id fell vv as of a temporary or 
The facts of the present matter are that Donna Jex slipped and fell on a puddle of 
water about four inches in diameter on the floor. (R at 289) No one had seen the puddle 
That slippery substance on the floor can only be characterized as temporary in nature, as 
opposed to permanent. The I Jtah Supreme Court's reasoning in Merino, 975 P.2d at 468, 
ti\ e: 
The present case does not involve an unsafe condition of a 
permanent, or even semi-permanent, nature. Ms. Merino 
slipped on a kiwi in 1993 and then slipped on a jalapeno a 
year later. There is no testimony that the floor was 
permanently covered with fnlit or vegetable debris. 
I d I likewise, there is no evidence ii i tl ic: presei it i i latter that tl le flooi 
Deli was pe rmanen t ly or eveii repeatedly covered wi th wa te r . Accord ing ly , it L AW _ :_; .K 
viewed as a temporary condition. Thus, because the alleged condition was temporary in 
rijifiift' ill unit i In <un IM i1 ii million Ini ( iimnum iml^muil DMIIM U \ n,i«, lequiin! I 
SIIOH (1) that the Hickory Kist defendants had actual or constructive notice of the alleged 
water on the floor; and (2) that after such notice, they had sufficient time to remedy it. 
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II. The Hickory Kist Defendants Had No Notice of the Alleged Slippery 
Condition on the Store Floor. 
It is undisputed that the Hickory Kist defendants had no actual notice of the water 
on the store floor before Donna Jex slipped and fell on it. (R. at 284) Accordingly, in 
order for Ms. Jex to defeat the Hickory Kist defendants' motion for summary judgment, 
she had to show that they had constructive notice. Although much of the argument in the 
Appellant's Brief is spent saying that there is insufficient guidance under Utah case law 
as to what constitutes constructive notice, Utah case law is clear that constructive notice 
is imputed when "the condition had existed long enough that [the storeowner] should 
have discovered it." Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478 (citing Allen, 538 P.2d at 176). 
The Utah Supreme Court elaborated on the type of circumstances in which a 
storeowner could be found to have constructive notice of a dangerous condition in Ohlson 
v. Safeway Stores, Inc.. 568 P.2d 753, 754-55 (Utah 1977). In Ohlson, the plaintiff 
slipped and fell on some dry spaghetti on a grocery store floor. Id at 754. The testimony 
at trial was that "the spaghetti was dirty, crushed, broken into small pieces, and that it 
extended from aisle ten around the end of that aisle into the main aisle for five or six feet 
toward the cash register at the front of the store." Id. Other notable facts were that the 
only inspection of the area was "a casual glance down the aisle" forty-five minutes before 
the accident, even though the store manager knew it was during the busiest time for the 
store, and the aisle in which the spaghetti was strewn was visible from the cash register. 
See id. at 755. The Ohlson court affirmed the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, 
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reasoning as follows: "Considering the area over which the spaghetti was strewn and the 
dirty and broken condition it was in, coupled with other evidence recited above, the jury 
could reasonably find as it did." Id Thus, the Utah Supreme Court was willing to find 
constructive notice where the evidence supported that a hazardous condition existed long 
enough that the storeowner should have known of its existence. 
In contrast, the Utah Supreme Court is unwilling to find constructive notice where 
it is grounded on speculation. See Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d 364, 365, 284 
P.2d 477, 478 (1955) ("a jury cannot be permitted to speculate that the defendant was 
negligent"). The Utah Supreme Court described the facts in Lindsay as follows: 
Plaintiff, after dining in defendant's coffee shop, slipped in a 
small quantity of water which somehow got on the floor some 
time after she was seated. Although the evidence indicated 
that a waitress delivered water in glasses to plaintiff and her 
companion, there is no evidence as to whether the waitress, 
the plaintiff, her companion, other patrons or persons spilled 
the water on the floor, or exactly when it was spilled, or 
whether the management knew of its existence. In other 
words, there was no evidence as to how the water got onto the 
floor, by whom it was deposited, exactly when it arrived there 
or that the defendant had knowledge of its presence. 
Id. at 365, 284 P.2d at 478. Given those facts, the court affirmed judgment against the 
plaintiff. See id. 
Turning to the present matter, constructive notice cannot be imputed to the 
Hickory Kist defendants because there is no evidence as to how long the water had been 
there on the floor before the accident. Plaintiffs deposition testimony in this regard is as 
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follows: 
Q. Are you aware of any fact that would suggest that anyone 
from History Kist saw water on the floor prior to the time you 
fell? 
A. No. 
* * * * 
Q. And you're not aware of any fact that would suggest that 
anyone at Hickory Kist knew there was water there on the 
floor? 
A. No, I doubt it. 
* * * * 
Q. Do you know of anyone at Hickory Kist that saw or knew 
that there was water on the floor before the time that you fell? 
A. I don't know. I just — 
Q. And you didn't see any water on the floor before you fell? 
A. No, huh-uh. 
(See Deposition of Donna Jex, R. at 131-33) 
The testimony of the store employees also demonstrates that no one saw any water 
on the floor prior to Plaintiffs fall. 
Q. Okay. I'm limiting my question to before that fall. Were 
you aware of any water— 
A. No. 
Q. — that was on the floor prior to her fall? 
A. No. 
(See Deposition of James Fillmore, R. at 123 and 126) 
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Q. Do you know if there was water on the floor when she 
fell? 
A. Not that I know of, no. 
(See Deposition of Randy Russell, R. at 115-17) 
Q. Was there water on the floor? 
A. I don't think there would have been water on the floor 
unless it come from Donna's boots when she walked in. 
* * * * 
Q. There's never been water on the floor in the morning? 
A. There's never been water on the floor in the morning. 
Not in that area, no. 
(See Deposition of Sharlene Barber, R. at 119-21) The testimony is clear that no one 
from Hickory Kist saw water on the floor prior to the time that Donna Jex fell. In fact, 
the evidence tends to suggest that the water may have come from Ms. Jex's own shoes as 
she entered the store. 
Moreover, unlike the dirty and strewn spaghetti in Ohlson, 568 P.2d at 754, there 
was nothing about the puddle of water itself to suggest that it had been there for any 
period of time before Ms. Jex slipped in it. 
The Brief of the Appellant argues that the deeper tread of the shoes of James 
Fillmore and Sharlene Barber, as opposed to Donna Jex, suggests that the water came 
from their shoes. However, that fact does not establish, more likely than not, that they 
were the source of the puddle. Even in a light most favorable to Donna Jex, a jury would 
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be required to speculate as to the source of the puddle. Accordingly, the present case is 
similar to Lindsay, 3 Utah 2d at 365, 284 P.2d at 478, supra. In Lindsay, the plaintiff 
could have argued that the waitress had more opportunity to spill water on the floor as she 
delivered glasses of water to her patrons. However, it would have amounted to nothing 
more than speculation, and "a jury cannot be permitted to speculate that the defendant 
was negligent." Id Likewise, a jury could not conclude under the facts of the present 
matter that the source of the water was the Hickory Kist defendants, as opposed to Donna 
Jex, the Pepsi delivery man, or some other source. 
On that basis, the present matter is distinguishable from Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha 
Beta, 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In Silcox, the plaintiff slipped and fell on a 
puddle of water in a grocery store that came from melting ice stacked on a stocking cart. 
See id. at 624. The court found that a reasonable inference could be drawn that the cart 
used for stocking groceries was left by a store employee, creating a foreseeable risk of 
harm. See id Because a jury could conclude, more likely than not, that the known source 
of water (melted ice from the stocking cart) came from a store employee, constructive 
knowledge could be imputed to the storeowner. See id at 624-25. In the present matter, 
there is nothing about the puddle of water to suggest that it came from the Hickory Kist 
defendants, as opposed to Donna Jex or some other source. 
"The owner of a business is not a guarantor that his business invitees will not slip 
and fall." Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478. Accordingly, before he may be found liable, a 
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business owner must be shown to have had actual or constructive knowledge of a 
hazardous condition and must have had sufficient time to have remedied it. Before a 
business owner should be imputed with constructive knowledge of a hazardous condition, 
there should be appreciable evidence that he either created the condition himself or that it 
existed long enough that he should have discovered it. Donna Jex has failed to meet her 
burden of proof. Accordingly, her claim fails as a matter of law. 
III. Hickory Kist Defendants Cannot Be Found Liable for Their Method of 
Operation as a Matter of Law. 
The Brief of Appellant argues that the Hickory Kist defendants may be found 
liable, without a showing of actual or constructive notice, if their method of operation fell 
below the standard of care. However, key elements of such a claim are that the condition 
created by the method of operation be foreseeable and inherently dangerous. See 
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 479 (citing Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360, 362 
(Utah 1973); Allen, 538 P.2d at 176-77). 
In Schnuphase, the plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on some ice 
cream that was on the floor in the deli section of the defendant's store. See Schnuphase, 
918 P.2d at 477. The plaintiff claimed, among other things, that the defendant failed to 
take the following precautionary measures: "installation of nonskid mats or any other 
traction-enhancing coverings, placement of warning signs indicating the possibility of 
encountering spilled ice cream, appointment of a spill monitor in the deli section, or 
installation of a lower counter to facilitate employee monitoring of the area." Id. at 479. 
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Nevertheless, the court found, as a matter of law, that such method of operation did not 
create an inherently dangerous condition. See id. 
In the present matter, the Brief of Appellant suggests that the defendants failed to 
have better lighting; inspect the floors more frequently; place more mats on the floor; 
place signs stating "slippery when wet;" and have written checklists and formal training 
for caring for floors on snowy days. Such alleged shortcomings are similar to those 
alleged by the plaintiff in Schnuphase. Just as in Schnuphase, Donna Jex in the present 
matter has failed to provide evidence that such shortcomings created an inherently 
dangerous condition. Moreover, since there is no evidence regarding how or when the 
water got there, there is no evidence to suggest that the additional safeguards would have 
prevented the subject accident. As the Schnuphase court reasoned, 
If [the store owner's] duty required further safety measures, 
we are made to wonder . . . how far the defendant would have 
to go in protecting the customers, both in method and in area. 
There does not appear to be any reasonable and practical 
answer to that inquiry. 
Id. quoting Long, 531 P.2d at 362. On the basis of the foregoing, Donna Jex's claim of 
negligent method of operation must fail as a matter of law. 
The cases of Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and 
De Weese v. J.C. Penny Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 (1956) are both distinguishable 
from the present matter. In Schnuphase, the Utah Supreme Court explained Canfield, 
finding that "Albertsons created a temporary condition by placing empty boxes around a 
-13-
'farmer's pack' display of lettuce . . . . " See Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 479 (citing 
Canfield, 841 P.2d at 1225). The Schnuphase court further found that "Albertsons had 
notice of the potentially hazardous condition, as evidenced by the store's placement of 
empty boxes and its instituting a regular schedule for inspecting and cleaning the produce 
section." Id, (citing Canfield, 841 P.2d at 1227). Thus, the Schnuphase court found that 
the Albertsons defendant in Canfield created the hazardous condition and further had 
notice of the condition evidenced by its inspection and cleaning procedures. 
Similarly, in De Weese, the defendant J.C. Penny created a potentially hazardous 
condition by implementing a policy of laying down mats and applying abrasives to 
terrazzo surfacing on the store floor to prevent slipping during rainy or snowy weather. 
See De Weese, 5 Utah 2d at 120, 297 P.2d at 900. When J.C. Penney neglected to put 
down the mats or abrasives during a snow storm and the plaintiff slipped and fell, J.C. 
Penney was held liable for the plaintiffs injuries. See id. Crucial to the court's ruling 
was the fact that "it could have been 25 to 30 minutes after the storm began that the 
accident occurred, during which time it was, of course, observable by the defendant's 
employees out of the windows." Id. at 122, 297 P.2d at 902. The court reasoned: 
Upon the basis of such evidence we conclude that reasonable 
minds could find that sufficient precipitation had fallen and 
that enough time had elapsed so that in the exercise of 
ordinary and reasonable care for the safety of its customers, 
the defendant should have employed the corrective measures. 
Id. Because J.C. Penney failed to employ the corrective measures it implemented to 
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remedy the known hazardous condition, it could be found liable for the plaintiffs 
resulting injuries. 
In the present matter, the Hickory Kist defendants did not employ a method of 
operation that created a hazardous condition, as in Canfield and De Weese. Accordingly, 
Donna Jex was required to prove that the Hickory Kist defendants had actual or 
constructive notice of the puddle of water on the floor. 
IV. Donna Jex Is Not Entitled to Summary Judgment 
The Brief of Appellant argues that not only should this Court reverse the trial 
court's order of summary judgment in favor of the Hickory Kist defendants but it should 
grant summary judgment in favor of Donna Jex. The ground for that argument is that Ms. 
Jex submitted an affidavit from expert witness Charles Haines testifying regarding the 
standard of care owed by the Hickory Kist defendants and that they did not submit an 
affidavit from a countering expert. However, such an argument presupposes that the 
Hickory Kist defendants had notice of the puddle of water on the store floor, a fact that 
the plaintiff cannot prove. As stated above, 
fault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that liability 
results therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that he 
had knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual 
knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the condition 
had existed long enough that he should have discovered it; 
and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that 
in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it. 
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478. 
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Even under the method of operation line of cases, Donna Jex has not made a prima 
facie case of negligence against the Hickory Kist defendants. In Schnuphase, supra the 
plaintiff claimed, among other things, that the defendant failed to take the following 
precautionary measures: "installation of nonskid mats or any other traction-enhancing 
coverings, placement of warning signs indicating the possibility of encountering spilled 
ice cream, appointment of a spill monitor in the deli section, or installation of a lower 
counter to facilitate employee monitoring of the area." Id. at 479. Nevertheless, the court 
found, as a matter of law, that such method of operation did not create an inherently 
dangerous condition. See id 
In the present matter, the Brief of Appellant suggests that the defendants failed to 
have better lighting; inspect the floors more frequently; place more mats on the floor; 
place signs stating "slippery when wet;" and have written checklists and formal training 
for caring for floors on snowy days. Such alleged shortcomings are similar to those 
alleged by the plaintiff in Schnuphase. Just as in Schnuphase, Donna Jex in the present 
matter has failed to provide evidence that such shortcomings created an inherently 
dangerous condition. 
The mere fact that Ms. Jex has presented claimed shortcomings through expert 
affidavit does not establish a standard of care in this matter. The Utah Court of Appeals 
discussed that issue in Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). The court explained: 
It is true that expert testimony may be helpful in elucidating 
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the applicable standard of care in certain cases, and even 
necessary in others.. . . Such testimony is needed "where the 
average person has little understanding of the duties owed by 
particular trades or professions," as in cases involving 
medical doctors, architects, and engineers. 
Id. at 574 (internal citations omitted). However, "[w]here the propriety of the defendant's 
action 'is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman . . . the guidance 
provided by expert testimony is unnecessary.'" Id., quoting Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 
348, 352 (Utah 1980). The duties a business owner owes to invitees are not beyond an 
ordinary person's understanding. Accordingly, expert testimony is not required to counter 
the expert affidavit of Charles Haines. 
Donna Jex cannot show that the Hickory Kist defendants were negligent. 
Accordingly, she is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly found that the Hickory Kist defendants had no notice of 
the puddle of water on which Donna Jex slipped and fell. The accident was a result of a 
temporary slippery condition on the floor of the store, and not a method of operation on 
the part of the Hickory Kist defendants. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the ruling 
of the trial court, granting summary judgment in favor of the Hickory Kist defendants. 
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/ 
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